Approved For Release 2004/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A00170002000172 Top Secret

p Secret 25X1



STAFF NOTES:

Soviet Union Eastern Europe

Top Secret

170

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001700020001-2	25X1
SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE	
	25X
CONTENTS	
September 2, 1975	
USSR-Vietnam	
	25X1
Soviets Promote Closer Relations with Yugoslavia . 7	
Yugoslavia: Tito Sets New Tasks for Internal Security Organs 9	
Moscow Art Show Anniversary May Mark New Round of Dissident Activity	
Soviet Grain Ports Able To Process Imports 13	
CHRONOLOGY 14	

25X1

USSR-Vietnam

The Soviets in Hanoi

Last week Moscow sent a delegation to Hanoi for the 30th anniversary of North Vietnamese independence and the opening of Ho Chi Minh's mausoleum. The most significant accomplishment of the delegation thus far is its meeting, announced today, with Cambodian leader Khieu Samphan, who is also in Hanoi for the anniversary celebrations. The Soviets have been trying to improve their relations with Sihanouk and Cambodian communist leaders ever since the spring, but until now there has been no good indication that their efforts were bearing fruit. Tass reported that the talks covered problems of mutual interest and that they were held in a "friendly atmosphere."

The Soviet delegation to Hanoi is headed by alternate Politburo member Solomentsev. Moscow's decision to send the relatively low-ranking Solomentsev to Hanoi may reflect a desire to avoid offending US sensitivities prior to the Soviet-US summit. China did not send a delegation to the ceremonies surrounding the opening of the Soviet-built mausoleum, but its delegation to the 30th anniversary festivities was led by Vice Premier and full Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien.

Solomentsev's delegation includes party secretary Katushev, who is responsible for relations with ruling communist parties and who laid the groundwork for President Podgorny's visit to North Vietnam in June 1972. His inclusion in the delegation may mean that Brezhnev, Kosygin, or Podgorny is planning a trip to Hanoi sometime in 1976. In Moscow's view, such a trip probably would serve to strengthen the USSR's current edge in Hanoi vis a vis the Chinese.

Approved For Release 2004/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001700020001-2

The Vietnamese in Moscow

The week before Solomentsev went to Hanoi, North Vietnam's chief aid negotiator was in Moscow, where he had apparently cordial conversations with Premier Kosygin and Soviet aid officials. Nghi's visit was billed as covering Hanoi's aid needs over the course of its next Five-Year Plan. It may well be that when an agreement is finally announced, it will cover more than Hanoi's aid requirements for 1976. Soviet propaganda handling of the visit, unlike Peking's, was warm and virtually identical to its handling of Nghi's visit this time last year. Last year no aid agreements were signed until December, and Nghi returned to Moscow for the signing.

25X1

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Soviets Promote Closer Relations with Yugoslavia

According to a Soviet diplomat in Belgrade, Brezhnev may yet come to the Yugoslav capital, though such a visit would probably be brief. The main problem is how to fit this into Brezhnev's crowded calendar, which is taken up with preparations for his visit to Washington and next February's party congress. Current opinion in the Belgrade diplomatic circuit is that Brezhnev will visit Tito sometime this fall.

Rumors of an impending visit have circulated sporadically for more than a year, with the Soviets the most active in spreading the story.

25X1

25X1

Sensitive to Yugoslav leaks about his embassy's support of pro-Soviet dissidents, the Soviet diplomat asserted that Belgrade has never accused Moscow of direct interference in Yugoslav internal affairs, even though it did make representations to the Soviets on the activities of Yugoslav emigres in connection with the "Cominformist" affair.

The diplomat also claimed that several emigres had been subsequently expelled from the USSR as well as from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. This action, he said, made a strong impression on the Yugoslavs and may have contributed to the "warm atmosphere" surrounding Tito's meeting with Brezhnev at the European security summit in Helsinki last month. The diplomat's assertions about the emigres are not elsewhere corroborated, and they may be a self-serving reinterpretation of earlier reports that the emigres were chafing under closer Soviet scrutiny and were in effect being encouraged to leave.

The Soviets are meanwhile attempting to steer
Belgrade away from its fixation with the emigres by
promoting closer bilateral cooperation in a number
of areas, including internal security. The Soviet
diplomat claimed that the lengthy visit made last
month by the Soviet interior minister combined business with pleasure and balanced the visit to the
USSR made late last year by his Yugoslav counterpart. The two ministries have been exploring each
country's experiences with economic crimes and
traffic problems

25X1

Yugoslavia: Tito Sets New Tasks for Internal Security Organs

The heads of Yugoslav security agencies have received new orders direct from Tito, and a major "vigilance" campaign may be in the offing.

According to a brief Tanjug announcement, Major General Franjo Herljevic, minister of interior, his counterparts from all the republics and provinces, and the head of the military security service heard Tito praise their past accomplishments and assign unspecified priority tasks at a meeting on Sunday.

The significance of the meeting is accentuated by Tito's decision to hold it on his first day in Belgrade after several months of vacation. Moreover, Stane Dolanc, number two in the party, Vladimir Bakaric, Tito's deputy in the collective state executive, and Premier Dzemal Bijedic were in attendance.

There is any number of topics Tito might want treated with more vigor by the security network. For example, the process of rooting out "Cominformists" and other pro-Soviets appears to be building momentum. As a result of the recent coups in Peru and Bangladesh, Tito may also be having another of his periodic spasms of anxiety about a massive plot to "get" nonaligned leaders.

Whatever the new "tasks" may be, it is almost certain that the internal security officials also heard some admonitions on their proper--i.e. subservient--relationship to the party. In mid-July, Vice President Bakaric warned a party plenum that the internal security organs might be growing too

Approved For Release 2004/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001700020001-2

25X1

strong and independent. He called for a review of party controls over the "watchers" and especially over the relationships between the military and internal security functionaries in the local communities.

Moscow Art Show Anniversary May Mark New Round of Dissident Activity

Moscow's unofficial artists, intent on marking the anniversary on September 15 of last year's "art massacre," may again generate a conflict that could give the regime massive, unfavorable publicity in the West. In such an event, Soviet officials may find it embarrassing to assert that their domestic actions are not circumscribed by the Helsinki accords.

The artists, who had been planning for an exhibit since early this spring, had lain low during the summer because of official harassment. Last week they received a "flat refusal" of exhibit space from the culture ministry. The reasons given were shortage of suitable halls and the prospect that exhibitors would include artists from cities other than Mosocw.

During earlier discussions with the artists, ministry officials seemed eager to avoid an openair show, bearing in mind the tarring of the Soviet image by the world press last year and the unwelcome, favorable publicity for Soviet dissident art resulting from an officially sanctioned open-air show two weeks later.

Both the regime and the artists now face a dilemma. The artists must decide whether to stage an unauthorized show and suffer the consequences, or pull back—an option that the regime's tough posture is designed to help them choose. At the moment the artists appear undecided, but most believe that foreign publicity is their only hope—a view that argues in favor of some gesture regardless of the consequences. The regime, on the other hand, evidently is seeking a solution that promises

to minimize publicity, and for now seems to believe that forestalling a show will achieve this aim better than permitting it.

The situation facing the artists mirrors in many ways that of the dissidents, Jews, and others regarded by the regime as the dangerous or embarrasing flotsam of Soviet society. Some have spent a quiet, others an active, summer. Many initially looked at the implications of the Helsinki summit optimistically, even while Soviet propagandists did their utmost to disabuse them of their hopes.

Meanwhile, the regime's continuing inertia in basic cultural policy had produced a familiar, checkered pattern of reluctant concessions to those few whose cause is taken up by the West, while the many without a voice are subjected to an intensified campaign against unorthodoxy.

As the new determination of Moscow's unconventional artists suggests, the fall may see some resumption of dissident activities and, ultimately, a testing of the regime's commitment to Helsinki's human rights and cultural contacts provisions. Such tests hold the potential for conflict, particularly since the skeptics among Soviet dissidents feel this commitment to be shallow or non-existent, and the Helsinki provisions to be enforceable--if at all--only by turning the spotlight of Western publicity and official pressure on the Soviet domestic scene.

25X1

Soviet Grain Ports Able To Process Imports

There are at least 16 ports in the USSR capable of handling up to a total of 36 million tons of grain imports a year without serious delay. Deliveries to these ports in 1973 totaled 24 million tons with no major delays reported.

Some problems could arise if individual port capacities are reached. A shortage of railcars could cause delays in clearing the ports. Storage limits could also pose a problem if total Soviet purchases are significantly higher than in 1973.

Principal ports include Odessa, Novorossiysk, and Ilichevsk on the Black Sea; Leningrad and Riga on the Baltic; and Nakhodka and Vladivostok on the Pacific. These ports, with an estimated grain-handling capability of nearly 2 million tons per month, handled 12 million tons during the 1973 peak.

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001700020001-2

CHRONOLOGY

August 26	Chinese Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan- hua confers in Peking with visiting Romanian <u>Deputy Foreign Ministe</u> r	*-
	Pacoste.	25X1
	Yugoslav party secretary Bilic arrives in Bulgaria for an official visit.	25X1
	Soviet-Danish commission for economic cooperation convenes in Moscow.	25X1
	Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto's wife arrives in the USSR.	25X1
August 27	Politburo candidate-member Ponomarev arrives in Yugoslavia at the head of	e
	a Soviet delegation making a one-day visit to discuss "Yugoslavia's techno-logy in theagriculture and food	-
	industry."	25X1
	Soviet party-government delegation led by Politburo candidate-member	
	Solomentsev departs Moscow for Hanoi to participate in North Vietnam's	
	30th anniversary celebrations.	25X1
	Soviet Middle East expert Sytenko privately says a new Sinai agreement	
	"does not help at all" and would serve only <u>"to divide the Arabs even</u>	
	further."	25X1
	US Congressional delegation led by	
	Speaker Albert concludes its official visit to Yugoslavia.	25X1

Approved For Re	ease 2004/08/17:CIA-RDP79T00865A001700020001-2	25X1
August 27 August 28	Turkish Prime Minister Demirel begins an official, three-day visit to Romania.	25X1
	Politburo member Kirilenko meets with Italian Communist Party factotum Longo,	
7	who is in the USSR on vacation.	25X1
August 29		25X1
	US and Soviet delegations at the UN hold their annual bilateral consultations.	25X1
	Premier Kosygin delivers a speech at a Moscow reception marking North Vietnam's 30th anniversary.	25X1
	USSR and Cuba sign an accord on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	25X1
	Politburo members Kirilenko and Sus- lov lead the dignitaries attending the funeral of L. A. Fotiyeva, onetime personal secretary to Lenin.	25X1
	Soviet delegation leaves Washington after a breakdown in negotiations on shipping rates for exporting US grain and other cargoes to the USSR.	25X1

August 30	Norwegian foreign ministry confirms the defection of a former Romanian industrial espionage agent.	25X1
	Premier Kosygin leaves Moscow and journeys to the border area with Finland to sign an economic cooperation agreement with President Kekkonen.	_ 25X1
	Senegalese President Senghor begins a five-day state visit to Yugoslavia, where he is to receive a poetry prize.	
August 31		25X1
	Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minic leaves Lima after attending the meeting of foreign ministers of the nonaligned	-
	states and flies to New York for a special session of the UN General Assembly.	25X1
	Annual fall trade fair opens at Leipzig in East Germany.	25X1
	Yugoslav President Tito ends his lengthy, official summer vacation period and holds a meeting for top Yugoslav internal security officials.	
September 1	Czechoslovak Central Committee re- lieves Rude Pravo editor-in-chief	=
	Moc of his post, reportedly at his request.	25X1

September 2, 1975

25X1

Approved For Rel	lease 2004/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001700020001-2	25X1
September 1	An East German civil airliner crashes outside Leipzig, killing 26 persons.	
	Bulgarian-US Economic Council con- venes in Sofia for its first meeting.	
	Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov begins a four-day official visit to Turkey.	25X1
	Czechoslovak Premier Strougal begins an official visit to Romania.	25X1
	Premier Kosygin and Finnish President Kekkonen sign the economic cooperation agreement at Svetogorsk inside the USSR.	25X1
	US Army chief of staff General Weyand begins a five-day official visit to Romania.	25X1
September 2	Turkish Prime Minister Demirel confers with visiting Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov.	25X1
	FUTURE EVENTS	
September 3	Visiting Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov to journey from Ankara to Istanbul.	25X1
September 4	Polish Central Committee to convene to discuss guidelines for the party congress to be held in December of this year.	25V4
	chila year.	25X1

September 2, 1975

25X1

25X1

September 9	US and the USSR to resume talks in Moscow on the rate to be charged for shipping US grain and other cargoes	
	to the USSR.	25X1
September 15	of the exhibit by Soviet dissident	
	artists near Moscow.	25X1
mid-September	r Foreign Minister Gromyko and bloc colleagues to arrive in New York to attend the general debate opening the annual <u>session of the UN Ge</u> neral	
	Assembly.	25X1
September 16	an official three-day visit to Ro-	
	mania.	25X1
		25X1
September 22	begin a five-day state visit to the	
	USSR.	25X1
late Septem- ber	Secretary of State Kissinger likely to go to the USSR for further discussions regarding SALT.	25X1
	Portuguese President Costa Gomes to make a state visit to Poland.	

25X1

25X1

September 2, 1975

-19-

25X1	Top Secret	For Release 2004/08/17 : CIA-RDP79100865A001700020001-2

Top Secret